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Reviews of American Sämoa, French
Polynesia, Niue, Tokelau, Tonga, and
Tuvalu are not included in this issue. 
Cook Islands
The period under review was charac-
terized by a worrying decline in popu-
lation, regression in the ordinary
Cook Islander’s purchasing power,
lack of confidence in members of
Parliament and cabinet, continued
public pressure for political reform,
and a general deterioration in work
and leadership ethics. Land contro-
versies and government-created jobs
engrossed the attention of leaders, a
few of whom tended to abuse their
status in order to advance family
interests. Ironically, while foreign
workers entered the country to take
up promised employment, the local
population declined, primarily due 
to lack of employment. Even as many
locals expressed deep concern at the
sudden surge of new immigrants,
especially from Asia (Thailand, Philip-
pines, India, and Pakistan, in particu-
lar), Prime Minister Dr Robert Woon-
ton declared that locals must be able
to adapt to change. He argued that
“new immigrants are a natural out-
growth of a developing nation”
(informal statement to students from
Brigham Young University, Hawai‘i,
visiting Rarotonga, June 2003).
The review period began with for-
mer Cook Islands High Commissioner
to New Zealand Wilkie Rasmussen
winning a by-election in Penrhyn
against standing member and former
Police Commissioner Tepure Tapaitau
in July 2002. Only seven votes sepa-
rated the two as Rasmussen won with
a total of 112 votes (CIN, 2 Jul 2002,
1). The period ended with the unex-
pected death of Maria Heather, mem-
ber of Parliament for Ruaau, who died
suddenly in June 2003 after a short
illness. This created the need for a 
by-election only months before an
expected general election. In between
the two by-elections, the controversy
over cabinet size and membership
persisted. By July 2002, government
was pushing for an extra minister for
cabinet, increasing the numbers to
seven (CIN, 13 Jul 2002, 1). Although
the government remained undeterred
by the NZ$158,000 estimated cost for
this move, there was resistance from
the general public (CIN, 30 Oct 
2002, 1).
While Prime Minister Woonton
was heavily criticized for taking his
spouse on long, expensive, overseas
trips (CIN, 26 Jul 2002, 1), members
of Parliament in general were accused
of “not giving their constituencies
value for money” and were occasion-
ally pressured to vacate (CIN, 26 Oct
2002, 1). Constant cabinet reshuffles
and rumors of reshuffles added fuel to
the fire. In November 2002 Cabinet
Minister Norman George was sacked
—again (CIN, 8 Nov 2002, 1). Soon
after, rumors emerged of a new coali-
tion government, the sixth since the
1999 general election (CIN, 12 Nov
2002, 1). Within a month, the port-
folios were reshuffled again (CIN, 22
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Nov 2002, 1). Then three months
later, at the end of January 2003,
Tangata Vavia and Terepai Maoate
were sworn in as new government
ministers, while Sir Geoffrey Henry
and Tom Marsters were sacked by
Prime Minister Woonton (CIN, 31
Jan 2003, 1).
An increasingly vocal group of
citizens for political change—known
as the gpc—gained momentum as a
result of constant government changes
and perceived inefficiency. They called
for an early election (CIN, 10 Dec
2002, 1), and pushed for political
reform on behalf of many concerned
citizens (CIN, 12 Nov 2002, 1). Some
2,000 people signed a petition calling
for change (CIN, 29 Mar 2003, 1),
including the abolishment of the over-
seas seat in Parliament. However, it
was generally understood that this
would reduce the total seats to an
even twenty-four, increasing the pos-
sibility of a hung parliament. Subse-
quently, there was also pressure to
eliminate the constituency of Tamarua
in Mangaia Island, which has the
smallest population of any constit-
uency in the country. 
By June 2003, only the overseas
seat had been abolished, with advo-
cates arguing that those who leave 
the Cook Islands no longer pay taxes.
The legitimate argument that Cook
Islanders overseas contribute far more
to the Cook Islands than the cost of
maintaining the seat was lost in the
general furor over a variety of mp
actions that have been perceived
negatively by most Cook Islands
voters (CIN, 15 Nov 2002, 1). 
Members of Parliament completed
much of their work in irregular ses-
sions that often went unnoticed by
most Cook Islanders. They made
several amendments (concerning
appropriations, the constitution,
value-added tax, income tax, indus-
trial labor, criminal procedure, inter-
national companies, and crimes) as
well as new laws (concerning the
Mäori language, a UN Security Coun-
cil resolution, banking, extradition,
mutual assistance in criminal matters,
financial transaction reporting, the
Financial Supervisory Commission,
and the proceeds of crimes). While
much of the political focus was on
the cabinet, a number of other inter-
esting, politically charged incidents
occurred. Tahitian fisherman Raioaoa
Tauae drifted in his boat for over five
months and ended up on the island 
of Aitutaki on 10 July 2002. His
harrowing experience at sea received
much attention, including from French
Polynesia President Gaston Flosse and
his opponent, Oscar Temaru, leader 
of the pro-independence Tavini Hui-
raatira party. Back in Tahiti, questions
arose regarding why information
about Tauae’s disappearance had not
been relayed to neighboring countries.
He had been spotted by Cook Islands
pilots over several days and could
have been rescued earlier (CIN, 18
Jul 2002, 1).
During the year, Teariki Heather, 
a successful Rarotonga businessman,
launched the Cook Islands National
party and appointed himself as its
leader (CIN, 24 Mar 2003, 1). Heather
hoped that his new third party, mod-
eled after a major party of the same
name in New Zealand, could topple
many old-time members of the Cook
Islands party and the Democratic
party. The National party’s first test
will be the 2004 elections.
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In January 2003, Cook Islands
Prime Minister Dr Woonton warned
the country of the need to be prepared
for the adverse effects of any outbreak
of war between the United States–
United Kingdom and Iraq (CIN, 31
Jan 2003, 5). The greatest concern 
for government and private sectors
was that the war would lead to a
major reduction in tourists to the
Cook Islands. However, tourist num-
bers were affected only slightly. A
total of 72,781 visitors were recorded
in 2002, slightly lower than the 2001
total of 74,575. Although US and 
UK visitors dropped by 14 percent
compared to the previous year, overall
European visitors still topped 19,600.
The largest number of visitors to the
Cook Islands came from New Zea-
land, with a 34 percent share, or
24,932 people (CIN, 11 Feb 2003, 1).
The steady tourism figures enticed
Royal Tonga Airlines to express
interest in becoming a carrier into 
the Cook Islands with possible flights
from Auckland to Rarotonga (CIN,
26 Jun 2003, 1).
Interest in the failed five-star Vai-
ma‘anga Hotel (formerly the Sheraton
Hotel project) continued as tourism
operators realized that the mainte-
nance of a reliable air carrier service
was tied directly to hotel accommo-
dation. Evan Smith, president of the
Cook Islands Chamber of Commerce,
and Don Beer, Jr, chair of the Tourism
Board, both pointed out that complet-
ing the Vaima‘anga Hotel was a prior-
ity in developing the country’s econ-
omy as well as in attracting foreign
investment. Beer commented that the
Cook Islands “need it to give comfort
to the airline industry” (CIN, 14 Jun
2002, 1). However, efforts to restart
the infamous project by both the
Covington group and the New
Zealand–based Cook Islands devel-
oper Tim Tepaki ran into difficulties
(CIN, 11 Jun 2002, 1). In June 2002,
Deputy Prime Minister Sir Geoffrey A
Henry suggested that the Tepaki deal
was better than the one proposed by
the Covington group (CIN, 12 Jun
2002, 1). But succeeding deputy prime
ministers were not so convinced, and
a lease was approved in favor of the
Covington group (CIN, 15 Jun 2002,
1). Meanwhile, a massive debt associ-
ated with the original project is still
owed to the Italian government. The
Cook Islands government’s hopes that
the debt could be settled with as little
as NZ$25 million up front appear to
have been dashed. 
A major project to develop a
marina business complex including
tourist accommodation at Avana on
the eastern side of Rarotonga contin-
ued to be promoted by some politi-
cians and private-sector developers,
although it had already been rejected
by the Environment Council and the
landowners. Factors of concern
included impact on the community,
the construction of septic tanks on 
the foreshore and artificial islets, and
the deepening of the lagoon. Land-
owners were strongly opposed to the
project (CIN, 13 Jun 2002, 1). Local
traditional leader Manavaroa Mata-
iapo George Nicholas expressed trepi-
dation at the general impact of tour-
ism development on traditional fishing
rights, and on fish, shellfish, and
bêche-de-mer (pers comm, 18 Jun
2003). The controversy highlighted
underlying concerns about the rapid
pace of development and its implica-
tions for a balanced approach to envi-
ronmental management. Many Cook
Islanders even opposed an environ-
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ment bill, citing conflict with basic
land rights, traditional practices, and
fundamental human rights protected
by the Cook Islands Constitution
(CIN, 11 Jun 2002, 5). 
Land and property problems are
also linked directly to the push for
development. According to a local
resident, information published in the
classified section of the Cook Islands
News indicated that large areas of
land on Rarotonga have been sub-
jected to mortgage sales by commer-
cial banks. The resident also suggested
that commercial banks had been put-
ting undue pressure on local borrow-
ers, perhaps in an effort to alienate
land (CIN, 1 Jun 2002, 4). As the gap
between the rich and the poor in the
Cook Islands rapidly widens, exces-
sive charges for access to land records
at the Justice Department (a fee of
one dollar a page for each photocopy
requested), bureaucratic demarcation
of required papers, and the pressure
to hire lawyers for even simple land
cases all contribute to a system that
favors the wealthy.
Underlying conflicts have also
developed between some church lead-
ers and landowners. The new pastor
of the Avarua Cook Islands Christian
Church, the first Christian church
built in Rarotonga after Christianity
was introduced on the island in 1823,
continued a policy of using a bull-
dozer to knock down old gravestones.
Enraged landowners and descendants
of those buried in the graves expressed
anger at the action. One landowner
took the pastor and other deacons to
court—the first such action in the
nation’s history (CIN, 15 Nov 2002,
1; 16 Nov 2002, 1; 11 Jan 2003, 1;
13 Jan 2003, 4). Unapologetic, the
pastor has claimed legal rights and
the need to beautify church grounds.
At the time of this writing, the matter
remained unsettled. 
Agriculture officials have noted
some evidence on Rarotonga of the
presence of the rhinoceros beetle,
which has caused disastrous damage
to coconut trees in some neighboring
island groups (CIN, 19 Dec 2002, 1).
While the threat looms over coconut
trees, agriculture production contin-
ues to focus on juice from the nono
or noni, a type of tree (Morinda citri-
folia, designated for the world mar-
ket); papaya (usually exported to New
Zealand); maire or maile, a scented
fern (Alyxia olivaeformis, for the
Hawai‘i market); and other vegetable
or root crops for the local market.
The fishing industry continued to
grow with the latest addition of a
long-liner, Mahr-Leena (CIN, 10 Jun
2002, 1). Most fish were exported to
either American Sämoa or Japan.
New Zealand fishing giant Sealords
explored the possibility of setting up
business in the Cook Islands, “work-
ing in alliance with the local fishing
industry by purchasing excess and
sourcing markets” (CIN, 22 Jun 
2002, 1). The government eventually
approved licenses for two Sealords
purse seiners to operate in Cook
Islands waters (CIN, 30 Nov 2002, 1).
The country’s huge exclusive eco-
nomic zone continued to attract both
legal and illegal operators. During
2002–2003 Taiwanese fishing vessel
Shang Yih #6 was caught fishing ille-
gally in Cook Islands waters. The
owners eventually pleaded guilty to
the charges (CIN, 7 Jan 2003, 1;
22 Jan 2003, 1).
Pearl farming continued to be the
country’s second largest income-earner
after tourism, although undercutting
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of prices by producers in Tahiti caused
some problems for Cook Islands farm-
ers. The introduction of a value-added
tax was perceived by farmers as a
negative influence on the industry
because it discouraged technicians
from returning to the Cook Islands
(CIN, 18 Jul 2002, 1). A few farmers
continued to be involved in setting up
farms in other parts of the Pacific.
New pearl-marketing operators set 
up shop in Rarotonga as pearls
continued to attract tourists.
As of 30 June 2002, Cook Islands
government debt was estimated to 
be NZ$126.9 million (CIN, 16 Aug
2002, 1). The 2002–2003 budgetary
appropriation included NZ$1,379,000
for the Ministry of Agriculture,
NZ$400,000 for Environment Pro-
tection fund, and NZ$100,000 to set
up the Money Laundering Authority.
Agriculture funding included a focus
on hydroponics for the outer islands,
livestock production, and a papaya
industry (CIN, 10 Aug 2002, 1). 
Controversy continued regarding
the ban on the public release of par-
liamentary travel details. The Civil
List, which pays out travel and
allowances mainly to government
members of Parliament, received a
total appropriation of NZ$2,339,400
for 2002–2003, an increase of
NZ$5,111 over the previous year
(CIN, 10 Aug 2002, 1).
The light at the end of the tunnel
for Cook Islands developmental activ-
ities seemed to depend on outside aid.
During the year, the United Nations
Development Program announced the
second stage of its aid program to the
Cook Islands. Already four years into
the project, a sum of NZ$350,000 was
projected for a biodiversity plan (CIN,
14 Mar 2003, 1). Prime Minister Dr
Woonton also signed a historic agree-
ment with European Union allowing
the Cook Islands “to access millions
of dollars over the next 20 years”
(CIN, 23 Apr 2003, 1).
It remains to be seen whether these
new dollars will create new job oppor-
tunities. During 2002–2003, poor job
opportunities in the Cook Islands con-
tinued to push young Cook Islanders
out of the country (CIN, 8 Jun 2002,
6). The high cost of living was also a
great disincentive to remaining in the
islands. Prices continued to soar with
evidences of over-price profiteering by
some businesses (CIN, 7 Jun 2002, 4).
Crime in the Cook Islands has been
very mild compared to other coun-
tries. However, the 2002–2003 year
revealed a growing problem with
crime, and an apparent decline in
morals and ethics. High profile cases
included the conviction of a forty-five-
year-old former pastor “on three
charges of having sexual intercourse
with a 14 year old girl,” and the bru-
tal murder by a neighbor of a young
man, Tuakana Tereau Teame (CIN,
28 Jun 2002, 1). Other, subtler crimes
also seem to have increased. Many
stores continued to sell old or expired
foodstuffs (CIN, 25 Oct 2002, 1).
Even though government inspectors
discovered this, no charges have been
laid against the retailers involved
(CIN, 2 Nov 2002, 1). Funds raised
from public appeals may also have
been misused. For example, questions
have been raised over the use of the
fund established after cyclone Martin
hit Manihiki Island on 1 November
1997, killing several Islanders. In
1999 a total of NZ$265,000 was
reported in the fund, minus some
political reviews • polynesia 151
NZ$42,000 spent on tools and equip-
ment for two villages. There has been
no accountability, although some
would like to see the balance of the
money spent on the building of two
hospitals on Manihiki (CIN, 5 Nov
2002, 1). 
Some top leaders and officials have
experienced apparent conflicts of
interest. For example, Eddie Drollett,
the chief of staff for former Prime
Minister Dr Terepai Maoate, was
accused of receiving kickback benefits
of at least NZ$25,000 (CIN, 1 Jul
2003, 1). Prime Minister Dr Robert
Woonton’s chief of staff, Piho Rua,
continued to be surrounded by rumors
of questionable deals, including
demands for cuts of business deals.
Some appointments to the Cook
Islands office in Auckland also sug-
gested possible improprieties. Pa Ariki
was secretly appointed as the new
consulate general, while the daughters
of the head of tourism and the prime
minister were sent there as tourism
officer and consular officer respec-
tively. The appointments of mp
Tepure Tapaitau and later mp Nor-
man George as consultants to two
different prime ministers were also
publicly perceived as inappropriate.
Even the Cook Islands government’s
own Audit Office apparently later
deemed both actions illegal (CIN,
27 Jan 2003, 1).
One of the government’s continu-
ing problems centers on its offshore
banking industry, which has been
targeted by countries such as the
United States. It has tried unsuccess-
fully to get the Cook Islands removed
from the list of eleven countries black-
listed by the Financial Action Task
Force for questionable activities (CIN,
8 Jan 2003, 1). The lack of an effec-
tive copyright law in the Cook Islands
has also allowed the abuse of intellec-
tual property. It has been suggested
that illegal copying of video and
audio material is worth more than a
quarter of a million dollars each year
for one local operator alone. Local
composers, artists, and musicians also
suffer from parliamentary inaction to
protect their cultural images and
creations from being plagiarized.
Some of the crime in 2002–2003
crossed international borders. Albert
Shahalain from South Africa was
jailed in the Cook Islands for forgery
(CIN, 2 Oct 2002, 1). An even more
elaborate South African–based scam
aimed to draw unwary Cook Island-
ers into parting with their money on
the hope of receiving huge rewards.
One Cook Islands victim lost
NZ$70,000 (CIN, 24 Jul 2002, 1).
Conned into believing they were
million-dollar winners in another
scheme, a Spanish lottery, Cook
Islands residents who responded by
phone were immediately charged
exorbitant fees (CIN, 27 Nov 2002, 1).
Some Cook Islanders have occa-
sionally initiated questionable actions
across the border. The Cook Islands
has been identified as the third highest
exporter into New Zealand of illegal
products such as turtle meat and
shells, as well as giant clam meat.
Some “13 percent of all unlawful
goods seized by the Customs Depart-
ment of the Pacific Islands” have
apparently come from Cook Islanders
to New Zealand. 
Rarotonga’s traditional double-
hulled canoe continued its historic
series of open-sea voyages; in July
2002, Te Au O Tonga departed for
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Tahiti, this time with an eighteen-
member crew, including seven women
(CIN, 8 Jul 2002, 1). The Cook
Islands representative at the world
fire-dancing competition walked away
with the world title (CIN, 12 Jun
2003, 1). Orama, one of the Cook
Islands popular dance groups, per-
formed at the European Union’s
summit of African Caribbean Pacific
Heads of State and Goverment (acp)
in Fiji (CIN, 23 Jul 2002, 5). Tradi-
tional investiture ceremonies continue
as reflected by various title investi-
tures held this year, including that of
George Nicholas, who was bestowed
the Manavaroa Mataiapo title (CIN, 1
Oct 2002, 1). Even efforts to displace
Pa Ariki as paramount chief in Taki-
tumu backfired because of traditional
loyalties; her subchiefs reaffirmed
their support for her (CIN, 17 Oct
2002, 1; 18 Oct 2002, 1). The Girl
Guides celebrated the establishment
of the movement in the Cook Islands
on 25 Oct 1928 (CIN, 17 Oct 2002,
1). Archeologist Dr Anne Di Piazza
excavated ten square meters on the
motu Te Kainga of Rakahanga Island
and discovered an earth oven possibly
a thousand years old. She found
“black charcoal stones, fish hooks
made from pearl shells, two chisels
made of clam and a pounder made
out of coral stone” (CIN, 17 Jan 2003,
1). And the Reo Mäori bill making
Cook Islands Mäori an official lan-
guage of the country finally made its
way into Parliament (CIN, 17 2003, 1).
Although the passing of the Mäori-
language bill was an important politi-
cal statement, the largest single issue
facing the Cook Islands during
2002–2003 remained its dwindling
population. An estimated 15,000
people now live in the Cook Islands, 
a significant drop from the 20,000 of
the 1970s (CIN, 15 Mar 2003, 1). In
April 2003, forty-seven more people
left the Cook Islands than arrived
(CIN, 1 Jun 2002, 13). The outer
islands have been particularly depop-
ulated, with many now unable to field
full teams in local sporting competi-
tions. Some Aitutaki Island teams even
fly in players from Rarotonga every
weekend to strengthen their numbers.
As local water specialist Sam Napa
observed, “In a survey conducted 
in Atiu Island we found that of 187
households altogether, 93 houses had
no people living in them” (pers comm,
Rarotonga, Jun 2003).
The government has tried to entice
Cook Islanders now living overseas to
return to the Cook Islands. “A total
of $100,000 was appropriated in the
last financial year to a ‘transition
fund’ to assist with the return of
Cook Islanders to the Cook Islands.”
The assistance to Cook Islanders from
overseas applied to those who were
returning home for two-year contract
government jobs. However, only
NZ$35,000 was spent before the
government terminated the program
(CIN, 30 Oct 2002, 1).
During the review period there
were some major changes in the pop-
ulation makeup of the Cook Islands.
Successes in tourism, pearl farming,
and offshore banking have enhanced
business profits and increased tax rev-
enue. Along with expected additions
in foreign aid, the budgetary situation
appears healthy. However, the realities
of a poor and outmoded salary struc-
ture, a spiraling cost of living, and
overconfident, self-serving, incompe-
tent politicians, paint a bleak future.
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It is hoped that things may change for
the better with proposed new laws on
immigration and land, as well as new
elections in 2004. But a better future
depends on educated parliamentari-
ans, moral leadership, realistic govern-
ment and private-sector goals and
actions, and the tenacity of a friendly
and hospitable Cook Islands people.
jon tikivanotau m jonassen
Reference
CIN, Cook Islands News. Rarotonga.
Daily.
Hawaiian Issues
In light of pending litigation (Arakaki
v Lingle) attempting to invalidate the
Office of Hawaiian Affairs (oha), the
Department of Hawaiian Homelands
(dhhl), as well as all other federal,
state, and privately funded agencies
that support Native Hawaiians, the
Office of Hawaiian Affairs stepped 
up its campaign for federal recogni-
tion of Native Hawaiians as indige-
nous peoples of the United States.
Federal recognition would solidify a
political relationship with the United
States government and put Hawaiians
on par with other indigenous nations
within US borders. Provoked by such
legal challenges, the oha campaign
for federal recognition has gone main-
stream, producing a slew of public
informational meetings in communi-
ties around the state of Hawai‘i as
well as high-profile televised forums.
Arakaki v Lingle was originally
filed on 4 March 2002 by sixteen
plaintiffs asking that the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs (established by a
1978 constitutional convention) and
the Department of Hawaiian Home-
lands (established in 1921 by the 
US federal government, setting aside
approximately 200,000 acres of 
land for Hawaiian homesteading) be
declared invalid and unconstitutional.
The suit also asks that any and all
monies and properties be immediately
returned to the State of Hawai‘i to 
be used for all residents of the state,
regardless of ancestry. In addition, the
plaintiffs have asked that the creation
of any similar laws in the future be
prohibited. If successful, the suit
would take away all current support
systems and programs designed to
redress historical wrongs perpetrated
against Hawaiians, including the loss
of Hawaiian sovereignty and the
resultant, dismal socioeconomic
conditions.
Arakaki v Lingle owes its standing
to the 2000 Rice v Cayetano ruling,
which forced the State of Hawai‘i to
allow non-Hawaiians to vote in the
election of trustees of the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs. In anticipation of
the ruling, Hawai‘i’s congressional
delegation authored a bill for federal
recognition of Native Hawaiians in
1999. They believed that the passage
of such a bill would negate similar
court cases and allow a certain degree
of control for Hawaiians over lands
and other assets currently adminis-
tered by state and US federal agencies. 
The latest incarnation of the fed-
eral-recognition bill, Senate Bill 344,
was submitted to the 108th Congress
in June 2003. While maintaining the
general thrust of its predecessors, this
version contains a new section that
would establish a registration roll for
Native Hawaiians, to be overseen and
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approved by an Office for Native
Hawaiian Relations within the US
Department of Interior. Only regis-
tered voters would then be eligible to
participate in the election of delegates
and, subsequently, in the creation of
organic documents for a future Native
Hawaiian governing entity. Critics
argue that this clause would amplify
the US federal government’s power
over the ability of a Native Hawaiian
governing entity to determine the
composition of its own citizenry.
The new clause is reminiscent of
the ill-fated state legislation that
established the Hawaiian Sovereignty
Elections Council and mandated a
plebiscite to determine the will of the
Hawaiian people in 1996. That vote
was problematic on two levels. First,
the Hawaiian people (as well as non-
Hawaiians) were uninformed regard-
ing the issues and implications of
what came to be known as the
“Native Hawaiian Vote.” Second,
because the Hawai‘i State Legislature
and the Office of Hawaiian Affairs
jointly funded the vote, critics saw a
clear conflict of interest between the
sponsors and the electorate, and they
accused the state of controlling the
process. Although public awareness
has continued to increase, it is clear
that the same issues remain, and that
the same conflict of interest may be
replicated on the federal level.
Generally, the debate surrounding
federal recognition has not changed.
Supporters of the bill laud it as a
shield for Native Hawaiian programs
and trusts currently under attack, and
see it as the only way Native Hawai-
ians can achieve autonomy. Detrac-
tors are unsatisfied with the domestic-
dependent nation status the bill would
create for Native Hawaiians. They
argue that the bill is merely an attempt
to protect the status quo and makes
no provisions for independence; it
may in fact block that option.
After her installation, Governor
Linda Lingle made good on an elec-
tion-year promise to campaign for
federal recognition of Native Hawai-
ians (Reynolds 2003). In her 25 Feb-
ruary 2003 testimony before the
Senate Committee on Indian Affairs,
Governor Lingle argued that the
Native Hawaiian culture was “the
foundation of the character of the
state of Hawai‘i, and the basis for
common understanding among our
varied ethnic populations. Our very
identity as a state is founded on
Native Hawaiian values, cultural
practices and knowledge” (Lingle
2003)
Lingle’s avid support of federal
recognition surprised many in the
Hawaiian community. As mayor of
Maui County, she had been criticized
for allegedly supporting the sale of
ceded lands (lands formerly belonging
to the Kingdom of Hawai‘i, taken
after the overthrow and transferred to
the US federal government, then to the
State of Hawai‘i, to be held in trust
for the Hawaiian people). Although
Hawaiians were not very optimistic
when she won the election, her testi-
mony illustrates a distinct shift in
official attitudes toward Hawaiians.
Governor Lingle, a Republican, is
now seen as playing a crucial role in
efforts influencing the Republican-led
US Congress, as well as the Bush
administration, to support federal
recognition.
The Office of Hawaiian Affairs is
not the only organization facing legal
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challenges. The Kamehameha Schools,
a private school established by the
legacy of Princess Bernice Pauahi
Bishop for Native Hawaiian children,
is threatened on two fronts. It faces
challenges to its admissions policy,
which gives preference to children 
of Hawaiian ancestry. In addition, 
its capacity to generate revenue from
leases on condominiums developed on
trust lands may be compromised by
state policies that favor mandatory
lease-to-fee conversions.
In 2002, the trustees of the
Kamehameha Schools admitted a
non-Hawaiian student to its Maui
campus. Hamilton McCubbin, chief
executive officer of the schools at the
time, stated that there were no other
“qualified” Hawaiian students. Led
by alumni and concerned parents, the
Hawaiian community condemned the
trustees’ actions. Some demanded an
explanation, while others insisted that
the trustees resign. As a result of the
subsequent media storm, the trustees
have since put their full weight behind
the trust’s original admissions policy.
In 2003, a lawsuit was filed against
the Kamehameha Schools on behalf 
of a non-Hawaiian mother who
claimed Hawaiian ancestry for her
son because her father was hänai
(adopted) by a Hawaiian family.
When she failed to verify the ancestry
of her son, the admissions office with-
drew their offer to admit him to the
school. Her lawyer, John Goemans,
who represented Harold Rice in the
Rice v Cayetano suit, then filed a law-
suit denouncing the school’s admis-
sions policy as racist, and filed for an
injunction to prevent the school from
cancelling her son’s enrollment, pend-
ing a court decision in the case. The
Hawaiian community was once again
infuriated, accusing Goemans of using
a young child as a political pawn in
his vendetta against Hawaiian rights,
and condemning the mother for letting
it happen. The case is still pending.
The Kamehameha Schools’ prob-
lems do not end there. The estate is
one target of a mandatory lease-to-fee
conversion policy in Hawai‘i. This
policy results from a particular inter-
pretation of the Land Reform Act,
enacted almost forty years ago to
break up the land holdings of large
corporations that dominated Hawai‘i’s
economy at the time. It was designed
to allow families to buy their own lots
and to increase market competition. It
was not intended to apply to condo-
miniums. In 1991, the state enacted a
mandatory lease-to-fee conversion law
that allows the state to condemn dis-
puted lease land under condominiums,
forcing the landowners to sell. Since
then, the state has forced the sale of
numerous sites. Three sites are cur-
rently under litigation: Kahala Beach
Apartments; Admiral Thomas Condo-
miniums; and the Camelot, also con-
dominiums. The land under Kahala
Beach Apartments is owned by the
Kamehameha Schools, which utilizes
the revenues to subsidize education
for Hawaiian children. The Admiral
Thomas Condominiums are owned by
the United Methodist Church, which
funds a preschool, a food bank, and
community outreach programs. The
Camelot provides revenue for an
order of Roman Catholic nuns as well
as a Hawaiian family. It is clear that
the 1991 lease-to-fee conversion law
is now benefiting real estate compa-
nies and a few wealthy condo owners
at the expense of two churches, a
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charitable trust, and a Hawaiian
family.
A related land issue revolves
around the island of Kaho‘olawe,
which lies just south of Maui. Imme-
diately following the 1941 bombing
of Pearl Harbor during World War II,
Kaho‘olawe was seized by the US mili-
tary to be used for target practice. In
1976, the Protect Kaho‘olawe ‘Ohana
began leading protests against the
military’s use of the island. They filed
a federal civil suit, organized rallies,
lobbied the legislature, and put their
own lives on the line in site occupa-
tions that brought national attention
to the Hawaiian nationalist move-
ment. These efforts were finally
rewarded in October 1990 when then
President George H Bush directed the
secretary of the navy to discontinue
use of the island. Kaho‘olawe for-
merly housed a navigational school,
and coastal and interior settlements.
Today it has been reduced to 28,800
acres of barely habitable, naked land-
scape, scarred by fifty years of neglect
and environmental brutality. 
By 1993, all bombing and military
training ceased and the process for the
return of the island to the State of
Hawai‘i began, based on the recom-
mendations of the Kaho‘olawe Island
Conveyance Commission. Concur-
rently, the Hawai‘i State Legislature
established the Kaho‘olawe Island
Reserve Commission to oversee the
newly formed Kaho‘olawe Island
Reserve. Despite its haggard appear-
ance, Kaho‘olawe still retains its status
as a sacred island, serving as one of
the main strongholds of the revitaliza-
tion of Hawaiian cultural practices.
The US military has not finished clean-
ing all unexploded ordinances on the
island, and safety continues to be a
concern. November 2003 marks the
end of the $400 million federal con-
tract to clean-up Kaho‘olawe, which
raises several issues concerning the
continued clean up effort, liability,
and future use of the island. 
The establishment of a Native
Hawaiian advisory council in the
University of Hawai‘i (UH) system,
which consists of nine campuses
around the islands, marked a return
to education as a focal point in the
Hawaiian movement. Named Püko‘a,
the council is supported by a new,
sympathetic administration at the
University of Hawai‘i. President Evan
Dobelle set aside $1.5 million on his
induction in fall 2001, and continues
to encourage Hawaiian participation
by creating a position to assist the
chancellor of the UH Mänoa campus
with Hawaiian issues. Among
Püko‘a’s goals are increasing the
number of Hawaiian students, faculty,
and staff in the UH system, and foster-
ing collaboration among UH cam-
puses. The council also advocates
parity with other programs for Native
Hawaiian and Native Hawaiian–
serving programs. Püko‘a’s general
membership meets twice a year, and
the executive council, consisting of
two representatives from each cam-
pus, meets every other month. Each
campus has its own council to discuss
issues specific to their part of the 
UH system. 
For Hawai‘i’s younger students,
charter schools have become more
prevalent and credible as alternatives
to traditional public schools. The
charter school movement began on
the continental United States in 1991
to empower parents and communities
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to work with educators, encourage
innovation, experiment with curricu-
lum, connect with the community, and
allow for alternative ways of learning
(Keesing 2000). Hawai‘i opened its
first twenty-five New Century charter
schools in 1999, utilizing project and
culturally based approaches to edu-
cation. The creation of these semi-
autonomous schools has enabled
teachers to create curriculum more
suitable for Hawaiian students. 
The more culturally appropriate
approach has been especially effective
for at-risk youth. One of the charter
schools, Hälau Kü Mana, reported a
98 percent attendance rate in its first
year. This is a notable achievement
because many of its students came
from the public school system with
annual absentee rates ranging from 
91 to 142 days. In the two years since
it opened, Hälau Kü Mana has taken
students to places including Japan,
Tahiti, Washington dc, Arizona,
Brazil, and Alaska. As part of the
culturally based learning that is the
cornerstone of Hawai‘i’s charter
school system, the students also learn
Hawaiian performing arts. In fact,
Hälau Kü Mana earned the Statewide
Excellence in Arts award for the
2001–2002 school year. Hälau Kü
Mana is partly housed in the UH
Mänoa Kamakakuokalani Center for
Hawaiian Studies, enabling younger
students to intermingle with college
students, fostering confidence and
encouraging students to continue to
higher education (Keali‘i‘olu‘olu Gora,
Hälau Kü Mana Director of Commu-
nity and Public Relations, pers comm,
2003). 
In addition to Püko‘a and Hawai‘i’s
New Century charter schools, new
support organizations continue to 
be formed. The Council for Native
Hawaiian Advancement, a member-
based nonprofit organization that
provides technical assistance, training,
and information on community devel-
opment, hosted its second annual con-
ference in August 2003. The Native
Hawaiian Graduate Student Council
held its first conference with students
from all fields. And the members of
Hale Kü‘ai, a Hawaiian artisan coop-
erative, met to discuss marketing and
the creation of a trademark indicating
Hawaiian-made pieces.
These organizations, educational
resources, and support programs have
developed despite increased attacks on
Hawaiian rights, lands, and assets. It
is clear that as Hawaiians continue to
empower themselves, anti-Hawaiian
sentiment will build as well. Backed
by some nonprofit Hawaiian organi-
zations as well as by the governor, 
the Office of Hawaiian Affairs has
increased efforts toward federal recog-
nition, which would confirm a politi-
cal relationship with the US govern-
ment and provide some protection 
for Native Hawaiian programs. 
The bill for federal recognition, 
S 344, is one alternative to help pro-
tect Native Hawaiian programs and
organizations as well as offer some
autonomy. Another option is to pur-
sue decolonization through the United
Nations and declare Hawai‘i an inde-
pendent state. Although the latter
option may be more risky in the short
run, in the long run it has the poten-
tial to provide much more autonomy
than federal recognition and to facili-
tate genuine independence. In either
case, the goal is self-governance for
Native Hawaiians. And, to this end,
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Native Hawaiians must be ever vigi-
lant and continue to assert themselves
in the name of social justice.
tracie ku‘uipo cummings
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The July 2002 general election deliv-
ered 20 members of Parliament who
identify as Mäori, out of a House of
120 members. Ten of them are in the
Labour caucus of 52 that leads the
coalition government. All 7 of the
Mäori seats went to Labour. Mäori
therefore expected to see at least 
3 Mäori cabinet ministers, with the
same number or more becoming min-
isters outside cabinet. It was indicative
of things to come that only 2 Mäori
cabinet ministers were appointed,
along with another 2 outside cabinet.
One of the ministers outside cabinet
was Tariana Turia, who returned to
the House with a very substantial
7,536 majority in the new Taihauauru
seat. Turia has developed the reputa-
tion of being the only member in the
House prepared to speak out fearlessly
on behalf and in support of Mäori, 
no matter how strident the media and
opposition attacks on her become.
Many Mäori hoped she would be
included in cabinet, as she had cer-
tainly earned such a posting. Her
appointment as a minister outside
cabinet sent a clear message that the
Labour caucus is still uncomfortable
with Mäori who consistently support
their own people. 
However, Turia is no longer the
only Mäori member of Parliament
able to articulate Mäori aspirations
accurately, clearly, and consistently.
Metiria Turei, a first-time member 
in the Green Party, is showing con-
siderable potential. Although the
mainstream media ignores most of 
her press releases, her party does 
not appear to be censuring them.
Georgina Te Heuheu of the conserva-
tive National Party, on the other hand,
has increasingly found herself having
to contradict her party leader. After
the party failed miserably in the
general election, the National leader
abandoned any pretence of support-
ing Mäori aspirations and set out to
attack any policy or program aimed at
improving Mäori circumstances. He
called for the abolition of the seven
Mäori seats in Parliament; demanded
that the government legislate to vest
the foreshores and seabed in the
Crown, effectively confiscating those
areas from Mäori; he argued that
Mäori should be given no special
consideration in any matter and that
all New Zealanders are the same (thus
willfully disregarding all socioeco-
nomic indicators that contradict this);
he attacked the government for setting
aside money in the budget for a
Treaty of Waitangi education pro-
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gram; he attacked the Waitangi
Tribunal for saying that Mäori have
an interest in the country’s oil and 
gas resources; and he promised to
stop Mäori from making claims under
the Treaty of Waitangi and to remove
those aspects of the Resource Man-
agement Act and Local Government
Act that protect Mäori relationships
with their ancestral lands (National
Party website: <http://www.national
.org.nz />). His racist outbursts have
not improved National’s showing in
the opinion polls.
In April 2002 the government indi-
cated that it intended to introduce
legislation setting up a new Supreme
Court to replace the London-based
Privy Council. More than 90 percent
of Mäori who made submissions to
the Select Committee hearings in 2003
opposed the proposed legislation.
Many called for constitutional reform
to precede such a move. Such reform
would have to entrench the Treaty of
Waitangi in the constitution before
many Mäori would consider the
introduction of a Supreme Court 
in New Zealand. Submissions often
noted that the present judicial system
discriminates against Mäori, with
Mäori being convicted and impris-
oned at a far greater rate than non-
Mäori. The Privy Council is perceived
as independent of New Zealand and
not tainted with the same racism that
exists in the New Zealand courts.
Many felt that a Supreme Court made
up entirely of New Zealand judges
would continue to discriminate
against Mäori.
In May 2002 a very successful
Mäori businessman was appointed 
to guide the setting up of the Mäori
Television Service. He managed to
stop media attacks on the service and
its personnel by refusing to speak to
mainstream journalists. The media
appeared to lose interest completely
after having attacked the service
continually over the previous twelve
months. By January the budget allo-
cated by government to set up the
service had increased from NZ$6
million to $13 million with hardly 
a murmur of dissent. Legislation for-
mally setting the service in place was
eventually passed in May 2003 after
years of strenuous efforts to stop it.
The opposition eventually supported
the legislation and its passing into law
went unmentioned in the mainstream
media.
The allocation of fisheries quota by
the Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Com-
mission continued to be bogged down
in disputes among Mäori. Eleven years
after the so-called “settlement,” the
allocation is still not complete. In
December the new commission chair
tried to force an agreement and ran a
propaganda campaign claiming that
96 percent of Mäori supported the
Commission’s allocation model. The
mainstream media believed the propa-
ganda, praising the chairman as the
savior of warring Mäori factions.
However, the media subsequently
ignored the fact that a large number
of hapü (groupings of extended fami-
lies) and iwi (tribal groupings) initi-
ated litigation to prevent the model
from being entrenched in legislation.
The litigation failed and the matter is
now in the hands of the Minister of
Fisheries.
In December the Local Government
Act passed into law. Mäori had hoped
for some major reforms to ensure that
they would play a more active and
meaningful role in the decision
making of local authorities. For it 
160 the contemporary pacific • spring 2004
is at the local authority level where
Mäori resources are most immediately
affected, where decisions are made
that directly affect their ancestral
lands, waterways, seas, and within
them, the wähi tapu (the sacred sites
and places of special significance 
that have been ritually restricted).
Although there are provisions in the
Resource Management Act 1991 to
recognize and provide for these mat-
ters, the lack of knowledge and polit-
ical will to implement the relevant
sections of the act means that Mäori
cultural and spiritual concerns are
constantly trampled on by developers
whose actions are fully condoned by
consent-granting local authorities.
Those whänau (extended families)
and hapü who can afford to do so 
are increasingly resorting to the courts
for relief. Yet the reforms sought by
Mäori were so watered down during
the passage of the legislation that all
judgments about whether Mäori
should be included in decision making
were left entirely in the hands of the
existing local authorities. To date, only
one of the eighty-six local authorities
has made provision for Mäori repre-
sentation on their authority, and only
twelve have chosen the Single Trans-
ferable Vote polling system, which
would give Mäori a greater chance to
be elected. The overall result appears
to be a recipe for continued litigation
against local authorities by Mäori. 
Keeping up their tradition, main-
stream media have persisted with
their attacks on Mäori members of
Parliament. This year it was Donna
Awatere-Huata’s turn. When the
right-wing act New Zealand party
suspended her in February, the media
harassed her and her family for weeks,
prying into their personal affairs.
Many Mäori, including members of
Parliament from other parties, spoke
out against the cruel treatment by the
media. By contrast, the suspension of
ex-Minister Maurice Williamson from
the National Party in July made head-
lines for a couple of days and then
vanished. No mention was made of
either his family or his private and
personal affairs.
Media assaults on Mäori came
under attack from an unusual source
this year: a columnist in the New
Zealand Herald. Since February 2002
Tapu Misa has been contributing
weekly columns in the country’s
largest newspaper. In a column
headed “Media perceptions of Mäori
still pretty distorted,” she noted that
“misunderstanding and misinforma-
tion abound and I’m beginning to
think some of it is willful. Mäori have
complained for years at the way an
overwhelmingly Päkehä mainstream
media continue to shape and distort
perceptions about them” (NZH, 27
Nov 2002). While the newspaper
continues to publish items attacking
Mäori, its new editor has yet to with-
draw Misa’s columns in the way that
columns supportive of Mäori have
been withdrawn in the past. The
Herald continues to publish letters
attacking Misa’s columns, although
there has also been the occasional
letter supporting them. 
In at least seven of her columns,
Misa (who is Samoan) has raised the
issue of racial discrimination not only
against Mäori but also against Pacific
Islanders, drawing on topical issues
that demonstrate that racism is alive
and well in New Zealand. Media
attacks on Mäori for seeking protec-
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tion for their wähi tapu have occurred
on at least four different occasions in
the past year. The Race Relations
Commissioner was vehemently criti-
cized for defending Mäori because he
had compared New Zealand’s colo-
nial history of vandalizing Mäori
culture and the natural environment
to the Taliban’s destruction of the
Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan.
Misa defended the commissioner,
saying “Joris de Bres chose to talk
about the many sins of New Zea-
land’s colonial government to help
throw some light on Mäori cultural
issues.” However, she concluded, 
“we are not yet ready as a society to
acknowledge the ongoing effects of
past wrongs” (NZH,11 Dec 2002).
One bright note in the year for
Mäori was the release of the film
Whale Rider, based on the novel by
Witi Ihimaera. It won accolades at the
Sundance Film Festival and awards at
other festivals including Seattle, San
Francisco, Maui, Toronto, and Rotter-
dam, and is enjoying great box office
success in countries including the
United States. It finally screened in
Auckland in January and ran for
several months. It is an adaptation 
of a well-known East Coast tradition
about an ancestor who rides on a
whale, and makes very poignant com-
ments about the restrictive and inflexi-
ble nature of some Mäori customs.
Two settlements of Treaty of Wait-
angi claims against the Crown were
completed this year: Ngäti Ruanui for
NZ$41 million and Ngäti Tüwharetoa
ki Kawerau for NZ$10.5 million. The
money is given to the claimants so
that they can buy back their own 
land from the Crown. The claims have
been estimated to be worth NZ$12
billion and NZ$3 billion respectively
(Mutu in press). As the Ngäti Ruanui
Treaty Claims Settlement Bill passed
into legislation, Tariana Turia warned
Parliament that NZ$41 million repre-
sented only a tiny proportion of what
was lost. The government also entered
negotiations with four other iwi,
including Ngäti Whätua o Öräkei,
whose claim covers Auckland city.
But the government reacted angrily to
decisions from the Waitangi Tribunal
and the Court of Appeal, which found
in favor of Mäori against the Crown.
In May, the Waitangi Tribunal issued
its finding that Mäori have an interest
in the country’s oil and gas resources.
The government immediately declared
that it would ignore the recommen-
dation that Mäori interests be recog-
nized. One month later the Court of
Appeal issued its decision that the
Mäori Land Court has the jurisdiction
to investigate the title of foreshore and
seabed and to declare its status to be
Mäori customary land. The Crown
had wrongly assumed that it holds
title to all these resources, when both
common law and the Treaty of Wai-
tangi clearly say that they belong to
Mäori until such time as their title is
properly extinguished. A legal com-
mentator noted, “It is difficult to
underestimate the importance of this
decision to NZ’s general legal develop-
ment. In some ways, this decision is
the NZ equivalent of the Mabo judg-
ment of 1992” (Bennion 2003, 1).
The government’s reaction to the
Court of Appeal decision was to
announce that it would legislate to
give the ownership of all New Zea-
land’s foreshore and seabed to the
Crown. The government’s intention to
remove Mäori rights in respect to such
162 the contemporary pacific • spring 2004
lands would amount to the largest-
ever confiscation of Mäori property.
The outcry from Mäori was instanta-
neous, furious, and uncharacteristi-
cally united. The country appeared 
to be stunned by the level of anger
expressed by Mäori, who for once
enjoyed the unanimous support of 
the ten Mäori Labour caucus mem-
bers along with almost all other Mäori
members in Parliament. The Labour
government reeled in the face of the
onslaught, uncomfortably aware that
they hold all seven of the seats spe-
cifically designated for Mäori in the
House. Angry outbursts from Päkehä
demanding that the government not
bow to Mäori pressure overwhelmed
calls by other Päkehä to respect Mäori
property rights. Opposition parties
went to extraordinary lengths to whip
up strong anti-Mäori sentiment based
on imagined fears that Mäori would
prevent public access to the country’s
foreshores. Only after several weeks
of uninformed public debate and
speculation did mainstream media
start publishing any factual informa-
tion relating to the issue. 
Within three weeks of the govern-
ment announcement, Mäori had con-
vened a national gathering to discuss
the issue. Over 1,000 attended, many
of them the mandated representatives
of the numerous tribal groupings
throughout the country. Factual infor-
mation on the issues involved was
available both through presentations
made by experts in the field and for-
mal written opinions. The resolutions
from the gathering issued very strong
warnings to both the government and
all Mäori members of Parliament not
to attempt to extinguish or redefine
Mäori customary title or rights.
Representatives returned home from
the meeting to inform their commu-
nities of the outcomes and to seek
instructions on measures to be taken
to resolve the problem. A second
national gathering was to be held at
the end of August. By the end of July,
calls for Mäori to take greater control
over their own affairs and resources
were becoming more widespread. The
government, on the other hand, was
refusing to discuss the foreshores and
seabed matter with anyone other than
members of its own caucus. 
In the year leading up to the
announcement, Mäori had become
increasingly strident in their criticisms
of government plans to lease out sec-
tions of the coastal marine area for
aquaculture purposes. In December
the Waitangi Tribunal had issued find-
ings that Mäori have rights in respect
to aquaculture and marine farming
that the Crown had failed to take 
into account in its proposals to tender
coastal space arguably belonging to
Mäori. As a result of highly exploita-
tive commercial fishing activities, the
country’s natural fish stocks had
become severely depleted. Shellfish
farming in particular was becoming a
lucrative business, although competi-
tion for use of coastal space was such
that the government decided to regu-
late access to it for commercial pur-
poses. The fact that this would mean
that Mäori would probably lose their
rights to the coastal space was disre-
garded in official circles. After 160
years of successfully depriving Mäori
of almost all their natural resources,
this was just another step in the same
direction. Officials and the govern-
ment chose to turn a blind eye to the
repeated findings and warnings of the
Waitangi Tribunal that the Crown
cannot steal Mäori resources with
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impunity. The decision of the Court
of Appeal caught them completely off
guard and their announcement that
they intended to effectively confiscate
by legislation took the country back
140 years to the last legal confisca-
tions of Mäori land. Those actions
resulted in civil war, as Mäori were
forced to defend their lands. It is
hoped that the government is more
aware this time that any further
attempts to confiscate Mäori land 
will result in many more Päkehä
fighting on the side of Mäori than 
did so in the 1860s.
margaret mutu
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Sa¯moa
Events and issues that stirred the
Samoan community in the period
under review include the petition by
Samoans to the New Zealand Parlia-
ment to repeal the Citizenship
(Western Samoa) Act 1982; rumors
surrounding the Sinalei Tourist Resort;
the controversy over the Oceania Uni-
versity of Medicine; the sars threat;
government structural reforms; and
parliamentary by-elections. 
In the mid-1970s, New Zealand—
under Prime Minister Robert Mul-
doon and the National government—
cracked down on immigrants who
had overstayed their entry permits.
One such immigrant, Falema‘i Lesä, a
Samoan woman, fought back through
her legal counsels, Dr George Barton,
qc, and Mr Rosenberg. Defeated in
the New Zealand court, Barton and
Rosenberg appealed the decision in
the Privy Council in London. On 28
July 1982, the Privy Council upheld
the New Zealand–British Nationality
and New Zealand Citizenship Act.
Barton and Rosenberg argued that
their client was a New Zealand citi-
zen by virtue of legislation passed in
1923 and 1928, when New Zealand
still administered Western Sämoa. The
clincher for the Privy Council was the
1928 British Nationality and Status of
Aliens (in New Zealand) Act. It held
that the Cook Islands and Western
Sämoa were “in the same manner in
all respects . . . [and] for all purposes
part of New Zealand.” The term
“New Zealand” was “to be construed
as including the Cook Islands and
Western Sämoa” (quoted in SO, 29
Mar 2003).
The New Zealand–British Nation-
ality and New Zealand Citizenship
Act clearly states that all Samoans
born in Western Sämoa between 1924
and 1948, and their children, were
deemed New Zealand citizens. Clause
16, Part 3 of that act states, “A per-
son who is a British subject immedi-
ately before the date of commence-
ment of this Act shall on that date
become a New Zealand citizen if he
was born in Western Sämoa” (quoted
in SO, 14 Nov 2002). On 21 August
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1982, then Acting Prime Minister of
Western Sämoa Tofilau Eti Alesana—
in the absence of Prime Minister Va‘ai
Kolone, who took ill—signed a proto-
col with New Zealand Prime Minister
Sir Robert Muldoon. The New Zea-
land government of the day used that
protocol to pass the Citizenship (West-
ern Samoa) Act 1982 (SO, 14 Nov
2002). While this act meant that
Samoans who were born between
1924 and 1948 and their children lost
their citizenship rights, it also gave
other benefits to Samoans. Samoans
who were in New Zealand at the time
gained automatic New Zealand citi-
zenship. Samoans were also eligible to
apply for citizenship once they gained
permanent residence status. Moreover,
the number of Samoan citizens who
could apply for permanent residence
in New Zealand under the yearly
immigration quota was increased 
(SO, 3 Oct 2002).
Former New Zealand National
Party mp Arthur Anae was in Sämoa
in early September 2002 to facilitate 
a petition seeking a repeal of the 
New Zealand Citizenship Act 1982
(SO, 1 Sep 2002). Anae believed that
the law discriminated against Samoans
and breached basic human rights.
Anae also argued that nothing in the
protocol signed by the governments
stated that Sämoa had given up rights
to New Zealand citizenship. Rather,
the purpose of the protocol was to
endorse the Treaty of Friendship
between the two countries that had
been signed on 1 August 1962. Anae
further argued that the Privy Council
ruling had nothing to do with the
protocol. Therefore, he said, the New
Zealand Citizenship Act 1982 was a
deliberate act on New Zealand’s part
to restrict Samoan access to New
Zealand citizenship. According to
Anae, “there is this fear in the New
Zealand pakeha [white] community
that 170,000 Samoans will rush to
New Zealand when they have free
access to citizenship” (quoted in SO, 
1 Sep 2002). Anae went on to say, 
“I don’t see 17 million Australians
going to New Zealand despite free
movement between the two countries.
. . . Honestly, I keep telling my former
colleagues in Wellington that most
Samoans in the islands do not want 
to live in New Zealand” (quoted in
SO, 1 Sep 2002). What Samoans
wanted instead, according to Anae,
was the freedom of access similar to
that of Tokelauans, Cook Islanders,
and Niueans. “If [New Zealand] can
apologize to the Chinese for discrimi-
nating against them with a Poll Tax,
which they accepted at the time, then
the New Zealand government must
respond to the Western Sämoa Citi-
zenship Act or compensate for the
Sämoa people by either allowing all
Samoans born before independence 
in 1962 access to New Zealand resi-
dency or increase the Samoan Quota
to 3,000 per year” (quoted in SO, 
1 Sep 2002). Anae also pointed out
that the Human Rights Commission
considered that the citizenship bill
involved a denial of basic human
rights in that it sought to deprive a
particular group of New Zealanders
of their citizenship on the basis of
their status as Polynesians of Samoan
origin.
While Anae was in Sämoa to seek
supporters for the citizenship petition,
a Samoan committee for the same
purpose was formed. Its secretary 
was Maiava Visekota Pëteru, a New
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Zealand-born Samoan and graduate
of the Auckland University Law
School. According to Maiava, “the
support from the community has been
tremendous so far.” With New Zea-
land citizenship, Maiava said, “comes
medical, education, employment and
especially, travel privileges to that
country.” Moreover, “we want to
clearly state that the petition to repeal
the law is simply to provide our peo-
ple with a choice for unlimited and
unconditional access to that country.
It is a matter of providing a choice for
our people” (quoted in SO, 25 Mar
2003). Furthermore, “Many Samoans
do not want to live in New Zealand
and all we are asking is for them to
have free access to that country and
the right of citizenship choice, instead
of going through the tedious immi-
gration screening and visa process”
(quoted in SO, 1 Apr 2003). Maiava
believes that because people do not
have that access, relatives in New
Zealand have adopted many Samoan
children so that they can migrate.
“Since people here do not have that
access, adoption becomes the only
option they have. . . . Perhaps another
fear is that the Samoan petition may
end up getting lumped together with
Maori issues,” Maiava said (quoted in
SO, 1 Apr 2003). Maiava urged locals
to sign the petition.
On 26 March 2003, about 2,000
Samoans marched on the New Zea-
land Parliament, and Dr Barton, the
lawyer who took the case to the Privy
Council, handed over the petition con-
taining 100,000 signatures to Prime
Minister Helen Clark. Those who
participated in the march included
sportspeople, academics, politicians,
and entertainers of Samoan descent.
Among them were Warriors Rugby
League center Ali Lauititi, world
champion discus thrower Beatrice
Faumuinä, and celebrated newscaster
April Ieremia (SO, 25 Feb 2003). On
the same day, over 6,000 Samoans
marched to the New Zealand High
Commission office on Beach Road in
Apia and presented the same petition
to New Zealand High Commissioner
Dr Penelope Riding.
On 8 May, when the petition was
presented to a select committee of the
New Zealand Parliament, a video link
was set up with Christchurch, Auck-
land, Wellington, and the National
University of Sämoa in Apia. Accord-
ing to the parliamentary committee
chairperson, Dianne Yates, this was
the first time the New Zealand Parlia-
ment had conducted its business using
video conferencing. The parliamentary
hearing started with submissions by
Dr Barton, Anae, and former New
Zealand Human Rights Commissioner
Pat Downey. All of them appeared
before the committee in person. After
Wellington, the committee heard sub-
missions from Sämoa as presented by
seven members of the Apia Sämoa
Citizenship Committee. The commit-
tee presented its report to Parliament
where a final decision will be made
(SO, 9 May 2003).
Anae’s views were not supported
by some of his colleagues in the New
Zealand Parliament. Samoan Labour
Party mp Taito Philip Field said that
this citizenship petition was raising
false hopes. As Taito explained, no
party in New Zealand—including the
National Party—supports this peti-
tion: “Any possible change of heart
may well depend on how much grass-
roots support there is for the petition.
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But at the moment, no party supports
it. It is also difficult to imagine the
situation returning to the situation
before the signing of the Western
Sämoa Citizenship Act in 1982, when
Samoan citizenship rights were given
up for certain benefits for Samoans”
(quoted in SO, 3 Oct 2002).
Taito believed that efforts to
toughen up on the portability of New
Zealand pensions should also be of
interest to the Samoan community. 
At the moment there is 100 percent
portability of New Zealand pensions
for people who have been in New
Zealand for twenty years or more.
That means they are eligible to draw
their full pension even from outside
New Zealand. Those who have been
in New Zealand for ten years will be
eligible for 50 percent portability,
increasing towards 100 percent as 
the number of years in New Zealand
increases (SO, 3 Oct 2002).
Prime Minister Helen Clark 
does not see any need to review the
Samoan citizenship law, even though
she was among a small number of
Labour Party members of Parliament
in 1982 that had condemned the law
(SO, 28 Mar 2003). The New Zea-
land high commissioner in Sämoa
had no comment when asked about
her views on the petition to repeal 
the act (SO, 3 Sep 2002).
In the second half of 2002, 
rumors circulated by a local news-
paper alleged that a group of thirty
people staying at the Sinalei Resort,
one of the best tourist places on Upolu
Island, belonged to a cult. Some sug-
gested they could be terrorists; others,
a nudist group (SO, 28 July; 4 Sep
2002). The rumors prompted Secre-
tary for the Prime Minister’s Office
Va‘asätia Poloma Komiti to check the
group’s credentials with the fbi (SO,
6 Nov 2002). Furthermore, Superin-
tendent Li‘o Masipa‘u said that the
police department was investigating
reports that the customs department
had detected drugs in the personal
belongings of group members (SO, 
6 Nov 2002).
The rumors were further inflated
by Duane Reed, one of the group
members, in an interview with the
Sämoa Observer. Reed, who joined
the group after learning about it on
the Internet, warned that the group
posed a real threat to the harmonious
fa‘asämoa (the Samoan way of life).
Reed said Samoans have been misled
into thinking that members of the
group were artists. “They are not
artists and they have nothing to do
with painting” (SO, 5 Dec 2002).
Rather, the small group belonged to
an international religious organization
known as the Maha Devi Ascension
Movement. According to Reed, the
group was headed by a multimillion-
aire German woman, known around
the compound as Gabrielle, who
claimed to be an immortal being 
from Atlantis and Lemuria with the
ability to build pyramids and turn
people into gods. Reed also said that
Gabrielle—whose real name turned
out to be Ms Wilson—planned to
build a pyramid on an island in the
Pacific that would bring 7,000 people
together (SO, 5 Dec 2002). Ms Wilson
denied all of the allegations against
her, and the resort’s manager con-
firmed that members of the group
were simply artists who found Sämoa
an attractive place to reside for a
while. The group left Sämoa in Jan-
uary 2003, six months after their
arrival there (SO, 10 Jan 2003).
Numerous complaints have been
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directed at the Apia-based Oceania
University of Medicine (oum) since 
it opened in 2002. It was alleged that
the Sämoa Health Department had
ordered its security to stop oum staff
from entering its campus inside the
Sämoa national hospital compound.
Another allegation was that oum
tuition funds were being channeled 
to an account in the Cayman Islands,
thus ensuring minimal monetary spin-
off to the local economy. Although
incoming Vice Chancellor Professor
Maloney dismissed these allegations,
it wasn’t long before students at the
university started voicing their com-
plaints (SO, 7 Aug 2002). In a letter to
the Samoan government, five students
said that on their arrival they were
“surprised to find that the most ele-
mentary resources were not provided”
(quoted in SO, 27 Oct 2002). They
expressed the hope that the govern-
ment would intervene to ensure that
“the international reputation of
Sämoa is not tarnished by the unful-
filled promises of the Oceania Uni-
versity of Medicine management”
(quoted in SO, 27 Oct 2002). A week
later an Australian academic entered
the fray. In a letter to a local news-
paper, he pointed out that 70 percent
of the entering students had already
dropped out, and raised questions
about the university’s accreditation.
He warned that Sämoa’s reputation in
Australia and New Zealand had been
“irrevocably stained” by these devel-
opments, and feared “that a recruiting
effort in North America, the major
source of students for ‘offshore’
schools, will result in more unsus-
pecting students experiencing the
same unhappy experience of the 
first ones” (SO, 3 Nov 2002).
By the end of the period under
review, things at Oceania University
of Medicine appeared to be looking
up. Some distinguished physicians 
had been added to the staff; the staff
member responsible for curriculum
development had been replaced; and
the government had reportedly spent
one million tala upgrading the facility
(SO, 13 Mar 2003). According to one
of the new staff members, Dr Satu-
pa‘itea Viali, head of the Medicine
Unit at the Tupua Tamasese Mea‘ole
National Hospital, “Though the uni-
versity is small compared to other
medical institutions, the technology
used is at the cutting edge” (SO, 
5 Dec 2002).
The international sars scare was
felt in Sämoa in May 2002 with the
arrival of ten Chinese nationals and 
a Singaporean on an Air Pacific flight.
Traveling via Hong Kong, Tokyo, 
and Nadi, they bypassed New Zea-
land and Australia, which had been
serving as points of quarantine for
Sämoa. In the absence of any health
department official, Akerei Le‘au, one
of the quarantine officers at the air-
port, sounded the sars alert. But by
the time the matter was referred to
him, the Air Pacific flight had already
left, so the passengers were isolated,
first in the arrivals lounge and later at
Leulumoega Hospital, before resum-
ing their journey to American Sämoa
(SO, 22 May 2003).
Concern was also raised for the
health of seven Samoan students
studying in China. Although the
Chinese Embassy claimed that the
Samoan students were safe and away
from possible infected areas, by early
May 2003 the cabinet had approved
funds to bring them home. The stu-
dents traveled back to Sämoa via New
Zealand, where they stayed for ten
168 the contemporary pacific • spring 2004
days under sars supervision (SO, 
10 May 2003). Meanwhile, Sämoa’s
under-23 soccer team was unable to
participate at the International Peace
Games in June following reports of a
sars case in South Korea. The team
had been fundraising vigorously and
training in anticipation of the Oceania
Olympic qualifying games in 2004
(SO, 1 May 2003).
In April 2003, the names of
fourteen new chief executive officers
of government departments were
announced. Under the government’s
structural reform policy, twenty-seven
existing departments and corporations
were reduced to fourteen. As Secre-
tary of the Public Service Commission
(psc) Dr Matagiäloﬁ Mölï explained,
the merging of some departments was
the result of a review conducted by
the psc Institutional Strengthening
Project. That project had been the
main vehicle for reforming Sämoa’s
public service. According to the prime
minister, the reforms were designed to
save money and “improve the quality
and level of government services to
the public” (SO, 13 Aug 2002).
According to tv Sämoa, part of the
money saved would come from the
elimination of jobs for about 30 per-
cent of the existing 4,000 members of
the public service (SO, 14 Sep 2002).
The reforms were received with
mixed feelings. In the debate in Par-
liament, most members supported the
bill, although others were concerned
about the impact of the changes on
the people affected. In an article pub-
lished in one of the local papers, mp
Tuiatua Tupua Efi (from the opposi-
tion Sämoa National Development
Party) asked whether the current
government structural reforms were 
a way for the party in government
(the Human Rights Protection Party)
to abolish departments that should
not have been formed in the first
place. In that case, Tupua said, the
government owed it to everyone to
explain fully what was happening
(SO, 14 Aug 2002).
In October 2002, at a function 
to farewell employees of the Public
Works Department who had been
made redundant by the reforms,
Prime Minister Tuila‘epa Sa‘ilele
Malielegaoi pointed out that these
developments reflected a global trend
to stimulate public service efficiency.
Drawing from his public service
experience, the prime minister
revealed that he too had to resign
from various jobs several times to
pursue other goals. He also told the
gathering how fortunate they were to
receive generous severance payments.
“The cheques you are about to
receive is surely more money than
you’ve ever held in your hand,”
Tuila‘epa said (SO, 3 Oct 2002).
Not everybody was happy with 
the redundancy packages provided 
to those terminated from their public
service jobs. Falefata Pëtaia Tuäniu,
former Public Service Association
chairman, said that the redundancy
packages represented a raw deal.
“They should be given more,”
Falefata said. “I’m talking about those
who have been there for ten years but
are now being given $3,000 for their
long services” (quoted in SO, 22 Sep
2002). However, some of the affected
employees seemed resigned to the sit-
uation. “I’m quite happy with the
financial benefits,” one redundant
worker said. “Perhaps this is also 
for the best, maybe there are other
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rewarding avenues out there for us to
take which would not have happened
if we continued to work for Public
Works Department. If these reforms
are truly for the best of the country
then we have to accept it. Life still
goes on” (quoted in SO, 3 Oct 2002).
Two by-elections were held in the
period under review, one at the elec-
toral constituency of Faleata East
around the outskirts of Apia and 
the other at Alataua West on Savai‘i
Island. On 6 August 2002, Lepou II
was elected unopposed as Faleata
East’s new member of Parliament,
following the appointment to the
Council of Deputies earlier this year
of incumbent mp Faumuinä Anapapa
(SO, 21 Jul; 4 Aug 2002). Faumuinä
Anapapa’s appointment came after
the late Mata‘ia Visesio Europa
passed away earlier this year.
The by-election at Alataua West
saw ninety-year-old Ta‘atiti Alofa
elected. The oldest-ever member of
Parliament, he gave his maiden speech
on 16 January 2003 (SO, 17 Jan
2003). Ta‘atiti replaced Nonumalo
Faigä, who had passed away earlier in
the year. But Ta‘atiti served as a mem-
ber of Parliament only six months,
passing away on 7 June (SO, 13 Dec
2002; 11 Jun 2003). Ta‘atiti had
joined the Sämoa National Develop-
ment Party, the party of his predeces-
sor. His absence leaves that party with
eleven members in its caucus. Lepou
II joined the Human Rights Protection
Party, thereby retaining at thirty the
number of members of Parliament in
that party. The number of members 
in the United Independence Party
remains at seven. Therefore, the
Human Rights Protection Party’s grip
on power is still very strong (List of
Members in Sämoa’s XIII Parliament
Legislative Assembly of Sämoa,
Ofﬁcial Records, 11 Jun 2003).
asofou so‘o
Reference
SO, The Sämoa Observer
Wallis and Futuna
In April 2002 the only Wallis and
Futuna newspaper, Te Fenua Fo‘ou,
disappeared following a dispute
between the customary chiefs of
Wallis and the editorial director. A
new weekly publication took over on
20 September 2002. Fenua Magazine,
with the same format and columns as
the preceding paper, now belongs to
Samino Foloka, who works at the
Department of Catholic Education of
Wallis and Futuna. The editorial line
has been completely changed to avoid
the wrath of the great “chefferie” of
Wallis. Leaders on the two islands
remain very sensitive to articles pub-
lished about Wallis and Futuna in the
international press. An article called
“A Wallis, l’ennui au bout du monde”
(Wallis, boredom at the ends of the
earth), published in the July 2002 edi-
tion of National Geographic, spurred
a local photographer to apologize in
Fenua Magazine for the inaccuracies
of his Australian counterpart, Tim
Georgeson, whom he had hosted on
Wallis.
Custom is at the heart of life on
Wallis and Futuna. On 21 November
2002, a new king of Alo (Futuna) was
enthroned. Fifty-five-year-old Soane
Patita Maituku has for the last ten
years been a sacristan, a position 
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of respect and responsibility in the
Catholic church. He has ten children,
one of whom is a nun in Africa and
was present at the event. The Kivalu
Tisimasi Heafala, prime minister of
Wallis, was deposed by the Lavelua
on 18 January 2003. His successor,
Kamaliele Muliloto, retired from the
Department of Rural Economy, was
installed in Kafila two days later. On
30 May 2003, Patelisio Ikafolau, aged
fifty-eight and retired from the health
agency, was appointed Pului‘uvea, that
is, minister of the customary police of
Wallis island, in his village Falaleu
(Hahake district).
The general elections of June 2002
were invalidated because about a hun-
dred voters had signed with a cross
without a witness countersigning. By-
elections were organized in March
2003. Three candidates were in con-
tention: (1) the outgoing minister of
Parliament whose election had been
invalidated, Victor Brial, of Union
pour un Mouvement Populaire (ump),
the majority party at the national
level, formerly called the Union pour
la Majorité Presidentielle (substitute
for Patalione Kanimoa); (2) Penisio
Tialetagi, unaffiliated (substitute for
Mikaele Tui); and (3) Apeleto Liku-
valu, affiliated with the left-wing
ufds party (substitute for Soakimi
Polelei). Presenting the candidates,
Fenua Magazine noted, “These candi-
dates were not easy to contact, even
for the local press that was supposed
to represent them. Only Mr Likuvalu
deigned to meet us for an interview
that was very pleasant all the same.
As for Victor Brial, he sent us a typed
text presenting his programme. And
nothing was heard from Mr Tialetagi
for two weeks” (FM 25, 5). The first
ballot, involving 9,925 registered
voters, resulted in 3,413 votes (46.9
percent) for Brial, 3,276 for Tialetagi,
and 587 for Likuvalu, with the latter’s
votes bringing about the second bal-
lot. After the first ballot, candidate
Tialetagi declared, “I have no pro-
gramme. You can’t establish a pro-
gramme when you are not an elected
representative and you haven’t got
any money.” His campaign manager,
Soane Uhila, is a former local ump
executive. Brial emphasized the privi-
leged relationship he has with the
French president, Jacques Chirac.
Between the two ballots, four Caledo-
nians of the rcpr (the local section 
of the ump)—member of Parliament
and president of the local government
Pierre Frogier, senator and president
of the Territorial Assembly Simon
Louekhote, Wallisian Corinne Fuluhea
(from Païta), and local government
member Atelemo Taofifenua (former
elected representative and former
Kivalu)—came to support “their
candidate.”
The second ballot took place on 
23 March and Brial was reelected
with 4,005 votes (52 percent), com-
pared to 3,687 for Tialetagi. The
voter turnout was 78 percent (7,749
people). Economic and social adviser
K Gata petitioned for annulment,
which was rejected in Paris by the
Constitutional Council on 16 May
2003.
In Paris, on 19 December 2002, 
the Constitutional Council declared
Mikaele Hoatau and Gaston Lutui
(Front National), who had been can-
didates in the last territorial assembly
election, ineligible to run again for
one year because they had not pre-
sented their campaign accounts in the
two months following the elections 
of June 2002. An inter-professional
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chamber was created on 27 August
2002, consisting of twenty-four
elected members representing every
sector of the economy. Its first presi-
dent was Silino Pilioko, who then
resigned from the presidency of the
Federation of Artisans and Small and
Medium Businesses. Noëlla Taofife-
nua took his place on 24 October.
Financially, the 2000–2004 con-
tract for development was completed
in 2003 by a State-Territory develop-
ment agreement. On 29 November
2002 the standing committee of the
Territorial Assembly voted in a docu-
ment named “Strategy for the Long-
term Development of the Territory of
the Wallis and Futuna Islands.” On
18 July 2002, the French Develop-
ment Agency loaned the territory 360
million cfp over fifteen years to mod-
ernize the telephone network of the
two islands, with the aim of increas-
ing the number of subscribers from
1,700 (12 percent of the inhabitants—
1,359 in Wallis and 368 in Futuna) 
to 2,400 in 2005. Overseas minister
Brigitte Girardin, having visited Wallis
(and Futuna) from 19 to 21 December,
confirmed the State’s support of the
long-lasting development plan pro-
posed by the elected representatives.
In return, she announced that they
had to seriously consider setting up a
direct taxation system. 
On an administrative level, High
Commissioner A Waquet left the
archipelago on 17 August 2002 to 
be replaced by Christian Job on 17
September. In May 2003, Paulo Lape,
deputy head of the Department of
Financial Affairs, was appointed head
of the Wallis and Futuna delegation 
in Paris.
Regarding the economy, in Sep-
tember 2002 the Territorial Assembly
chose Halalo, in the southeast of
Wallis island, as the site for the future
fishing port. The European Develop-
ment Fund could finance the first
infrastructures in 2004—a wharf and
a freezing plant—to the amount of
120 million cfp. Fripac, a company
that was important for a long time,
filed for bankruptcy with 600 million
cfp in outstanding debts. Conse-
quently, the former shareholders sold
their shares to an administrator from
New Caledonia, Robert Zoller, who
made twenty-two of the forty employ-
ees redundant, closed some of the
branches (Maxi Nord, Maxi Sud,
Brico Wallis), and established a six-
teen-year recovery plan. In 2003, the
bankruptcy investigation begun in
New Caledonia against some of
Fripac’s former shareholders seemed
to indicate that the accounts had been
falsified to allow two overdraft autho-
rizations (at the Bank of Hawai‘i) in
2001 for 210 million cfp each.
The first shopping complex in
Wallis, Fenuarama, with twenty
stores, opened for business in Decem-
ber 2002 at a cost of 650 million
cfp. The only bank on the island, 
the Banque de Wallis et Futuna (a
subsidiary of bnp, the French multi-
national bank), transferred its agency
there and installed the first cash dis-
penser in the archipelago. Since Janu-
ary 2003, the Fenuarama mall has
housed the first real bookshop in
Wallis, the Librairie-Papeterie du
Fenua, belonging to the Noumean
company As de Trèfle.
Futuna is still uninvolved in big
economic changes and a significant
event in 2003 was the opening of a
weekly agricultural market in Alo,
thanks to the cooperative Laga Fenua,
based in the village of Ono. A strike
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disrupted post and telecommunica-
tions services from 5 March to 14
May 2003. The whole economy of
Wallis and Futuna felt the effects of
the absence of minimum service.
With regard to employment, the big
problem remains the hiring of young
people. Following a navy mission,
three young Wallisians volunteered 
to join the army and went to Noumea
for a three-week course on 16 Octo-
ber 2002. They were then to be posted
to the Chaleix base (Noumea), or to
ships of the French navy. Emigration
is still a priority and the institution of
the mobility passport by the overseas
minister in September 2002 grants a
free plane ticket to young people
wishing to follow a course of study 
in France that is not available locally.
At the same time, as every year, some
three hundred grant holders between
sixteen and twenty-four years of age
took the plane to New Caledonia in
February to begin various training
courses, mainly in Catholic schools.
Sport is another source of emigration.
That is how Falakiko Tuhimutu,
sixth-degree black belt, became a 
yi-king teacher and director of the
social welfare centre of Bessancourt
(Val d’Oise). Fenua Magazine high-
lighted the “matrimonial” immigra-
tion of the only Wallisian living in
Sweden; aged 24, he lives in Falun
with his wife and their two daughters.
Other events of note during the
period under review: In October 2002
in Mata-Utu, a French-language
regional seminar on diabetes brought
together specialists from New Caledo-
nia, French Polynesia, and Wallis and
Futuna. Diabetes affects expatriate
Wallisians to a much greater degree
than those remaining in the islands. 
A photographic publication entitled
Les perles bleues (The Blue Pearls)
went on sale for the 2002 holiday
season. Susitina Moefana was elected
Miss Hahake 2003 in December
2002. A former Wallisian soldier set
up the first professional tattooing
workshop; Marquesan (tiki) and
Chinese (dragon) designs are currently
the most popular. Music Day was
celebrated on 21 June 2003 in Futuna,
thanks to the Futunian Association for
the Training of Holiday Camp Youth
Leaders. In April 2003 sportsman
Viane Hoatau, president of the
Olympic Territorial Committee, was
appointed head of the Wallis and
Futuna delegation to the South Pacific
Games, held in Suva in June–July,
which involved eighty-nine people 
for a budget of 21 million cfp. On
28 April 2003 Futuna celebrated with
dignity the bicentennial of the birth 
of Saint Pierre Chanel, patron saint of
the Pacific Islands, in the presence of
the archbishop of New Caledonia 
and the Apostolic Nuncio for the
Pacific. Four Wallisian nuns have
played a part in running the L’eau
vive restaurant in Prague since early
2002.
In view of the great size of the
Wallisian and Futunian community in
New Caledonia, we now devote a few
lines to it, as an adjunct to the annual
political review on New Caledonia in
the fall issue of this journal. One of
the cofounders of the Rassemblement
Démocratique Océanien (rdo),
Aukusitino Manuohalalo, who was 
a local government advisor, was not
reelected during the 2002 reshuffle.
He resigned from the rdo in Decem-
ber because he had lost the support of
his president, his party’s interests were
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not sufficiently taken into account by
the Front de Libération Nationale
Kanak Socialiste (flnks), and the
Saint-Louis affair was unacceptable
(see below). For him, “excluding the
Wallisian and Futunian community
Ave-Maria, is a little like ‘ethnic puri-
fication’” (Le nouvel hebdo, no 785).
On 12 April 2003, Manuohalalo
created the Mouvement des Citoyens
Calédoniens in the presence of three
hundred militants. The eleventh con-
gress of the rdo (fourth constituent
of the flnks), presided over by
Aloisio Sako, took place on 15 Febru-
ary 2003. Sako was elected president
for the ninth time and the new secre-
tary general was Yvon Faua.
The sad affair of the Wallis and
Futuna village Ave-Maria near the
customary lands of Saint-Louis is still
unresolved. At the time of the October
2002 agreement, the State undertook
to suitably relocate the 171 Wallis and
Futuna families counted there, as well
as the 20 families that had left a short
time before. The Southern Province
helps all families that expressly apply
to move. Each time a house is vacated,
it is immediately demolished to avoid
reoccupation by the people of Saint-
Louis.
On 22 August 2002, Laurent Vili,
the alleged perpetrator of the death of
J M Goyeta, was arrested in Montpel-
lier where he was a member of the
rugby team. He was then transferred
to New Caledonia’s prison where he is
still locked up—in the isolation ward,
because 80 percent of the inmates are
Melanesians. A support committee
created in April 2003 organized a
march on 21 May to increase public
awareness of his plight. It assembled
300 to 500 people, including Tino
Manuohalalo and Bernard Herpin
(Front National). A counterdemon-
stration of about 80 people was held
on the outskirts of the Saint-Louis
tribe. On 28 May, the Chambre d’In-
struction of the court of appeal of
Noumea refused to release “Lolo,”
arguing that he had initially admitted
to having shot in J M Goyeta’s direc-
tion (before retracting his statement),
and that the recent exhumation and
autopsy of the deceased proved that
the fatal bullet came from a weapon
of the same caliber as his. The family
of the accused reiterated that the
Wallisians of Ave-Maria were the
victims, that the house of Laurent
Vili’s parents had been burnt down,
that a lot of people had been shooting
on that day with guns of all calibers,
and that the murder of a young
Futunian a few months later had 
not led to any arrests.
A new wave of violence hit Ave-
Maria and Saint-Louis during the
second half of June 2003, set off by
the 25 June burning of a hut in Saint-
Louis belonging to Livio Gnikekan.
This Melanesian is currently in prison
for having unintentionally killed one
of his friends in April 2002. He had
also injured army chaplain A Glan-
tenet (serving as a priest in the diocese
of Wallis and Futuna) and shot at the
car of Saint-Louis’s chief, R Wamytan.
After two young girls said they had
seen Wallisians crossing the river a
little earlier, some young Melanesians
opened fire. That day, a Wallisian nun
and a gendarme were injured when a
Land Rover of the gendarmerie, taken
for a target, overturned on the road
leading up to the church. After being
abandoned, the vehicle was set on
fire. Then, two cars carrying inhabi-
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tants of Ave-Maria drove around the
road block set up by the gendarmerie.
Two of the young Wallisians and a
half-caste Kanak married to a Wal-
lisian, who were on their way home,
were then wounded by hunting rifle
bullets shot by Kanak snipers lying 
in ambush. Since then, there has been
heavy fire from time to time, likely
intended to scare or prove determina-
tion rather than to wound. During
every significant episode, the gendar-
merie has used tear gas.
This new phase in the Saint-Louis
affair seems to originate from discord
within the Kanak community. 
Moreover, the chief of Saint-Louis, 
R Wamytan, declared that burning
homes was a Melanesian custom.
Laurent Vili’s support committee
asked for a relocation allowance of
8.5 billion cfp, that is, 50 million per
family. The State considers that only
decent rehousing is legitimate.
From Saturday to Sunday, 28–29
June, more than two hundred gun-
shots were fired, another house was
burnt down, and a young Melanesian,
Stéphane Gnibekan, received three
bullet wounds. These new events took
place mainly in the Saint-Louis tribe
and apparently originated from con-
flict between the Wamytan and Moya-
tea chieftaincies. According to Les
Nouvelles Calédoniennes (30 Jun):
“With each new atrocity, it is difficult
to know if it arises out of an ethnic
conflict or if it is a case of internal
quarrelling in the Kanak world.” 
At that time sixty-one families still
remained in Ave-Maria. Since these
new confrontations, twenty-four
families have taken refuge in the
Mont-Dore sports hall.
In Noumea in September 2002, 
a street was named after a Wallisian
(Palaseto Sako) killed in Sarajevo
while he was a soldier in the
forpronu. In December, Wallisian
Soane Patita Takaniua exhibited his
paintings in a Noumea art gallery
before exporting his exhibition Mata
Vai to Jakarta, then to Carcassonne.
A dispute broke out in June 2003
between the aliki families of Hahake
represented in New Caledonia. In 
fact on 25 May, Atelemo Taofifenua
appointed his younger brother Paulo
as his home faipule and pelecita of
Hahake for emigrants. On 16 June,
Alefosio Manuopuava was also
appointed faipule of Hahake at the
Wallisian common hall in Magenta;
Tino Manuohalalo attended the
second ceremony. A Futunian born 
in Bordeaux and living in Papeete 
was elected “Mister Tahiti 2002.” 
In metropolitan France in 2002,
Wallisian Moana Togavalevale
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